Debt Ceiling Theater Abolition Act

Section 1. Short Title and Finding of Repetitive Insanity

This Act may be cited as the “Debt Ceiling Theater Abolition Act” or the “Stop Threatening to Burn the House Down Because You Don’t Like the Mortgage Act of 2026.”

Congress finds, for the 79th time:

(a) The statutory debt ceiling has been raised, revised, or suspended 78 times since 1960, averaging more than once per year, a track record that strongly suggests the ceiling is not, in fact, a ceiling.

(b) The debt ceiling does not authorize new spending. It authorizes the Treasury to pay for spending that Congress has already approved, making a debt ceiling standoff the fiscal equivalent of eating a five-course meal and then refusing to pay the check because you’ve decided you’re on a diet.

(c) In August 2011, the first-ever U.S. credit downgrade in history occurred not because the country couldn’t pay its bills but because Congress was publicly debating whether it felt like paying them. Standard & Poor’s specifically cited political brinksmanship as the reason.

(d) The 2013 government shutdown lasted 16 days and cost the economy an estimated $24 billion in lost output. The 2023 debt ceiling crisis cost taxpayers approximately $1.5 billion in higher borrowing costs, which is the fee Americans pay so that members of Congress can give speeches about fiscal responsibility.

(e) The only other country that maintains a debt ceiling is Denmark, where it is set at approximately 2 trillion kroner against a national debt of roughly 323 billion kroner — a ratio of 6:1 that ensures the ceiling is never approached, never debated, and never used as a weapon. Denmark appears to have figured out what the United States has not.

Section 2. Abolition of the Debt Ceiling

2(a). Repeal

The statutory limit on public debt, established by the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917 and subsequently codified at 31 U.S.C. Section 3101, is hereby repealed in its entirety, effective upon enactment.

2(b). Rationale

Congress acknowledges that a mechanism designed in 1917 to simplify World War I bond issuance has been repurposed as a tool for periodic economic hostage-taking, which was not its intended function, and that 78 consecutive raisings suggest the limit is aspirational at best and fictional at worst.

2(c). Replacement

The Treasury shall be automatically authorized to borrow such sums as necessary to fund obligations arising from enacted appropriations, tax legislation, and entitlement programs, all of which were approved by Congress, which is the body now threatening not to pay for them.

Section 3. The Denmark Clause

3(a). Alternative Ceiling

In the event that Congress determines a debt ceiling is psychologically necessary despite being functionally useless, an alternative ceiling may be established at six times the current national debt, consistent with the Danish model, which would place the ceiling so far above actual borrowing that it would never be relevant, debated, or weaponized.

3(b). Automatic Adjustment

The Denmark-style ceiling shall automatically adjust upward whenever Congress enacts new spending or tax legislation, because the ceiling should reflect what Congress actually does, not what it wishes it did in retrospect.

3(c). Purpose

The Denmark Clause exists solely so that members of Congress who feel uncomfortable without a debt ceiling can point to a number and feel better about it, while the number itself serves no practical function, which is also how the current ceiling works but without the economic terrorism.

Section 4. The Hostage Prevention Provision

4(a). Prohibition

No member of Congress, congressional leader, or congressional caucus shall use the threat of debt default as a negotiating tool, bargaining chip, or leverage mechanism in any legislative negotiation, for the following reason: threatening to crash the global economy to win a policy argument is not “negotiation,” it is a hostage situation in business-casual attire.

4(b). The “Already Spent This Money” Finding

Congress hereby finds and officially enters into the record that:

1. Raising the debt ceiling does not authorize new spending
2. Refusing to raise the debt ceiling does not reduce spending
3. The debt ceiling controls whether the government pays bills it has already incurred
4. Therefore, refusing to raise it is not “fiscal responsibility” — it is “fiscal arson”

4(c). Public Awareness

The finding in subsection (b) shall be printed on a placard and mounted in every congressional office, committee room, and television studio where members discuss the debt ceiling, so that at minimum the claim “we need to get spending under control” can be immediately fact-checked by the nearest wall.

Section 5. Credit Rating Protection Mandate

5(a). Automatic Suspension

If at any point the United States comes within 30 days of reaching its borrowing limit (under any ceiling that may exist), the ceiling shall be automatically suspended for 180 days while Congress addresses its spending and revenue decisions through normal legislative order, like a functioning democracy.

5(b). Justification

The 2011 credit downgrade cost American taxpayers an estimated $1.3 billion in higher borrowing costs in the first year alone. Every subsequent crisis has increased uncertainty premiums on Treasury securities. The automatic suspension is therefore not a policy preference — it is damage control.

5(c). The Taxpayer Tab

The Government Accountability Office shall calculate and publish, within 30 days of any debt ceiling crisis resolution, the total cost to taxpayers in higher borrowing costs, lost economic output, and reduced government services, so that voters may determine for themselves whether the political theater was worth the price of admission.

Section 6. Effective Date and Acknowledgment of the Obvious

This Act shall take effect upon enactment, which the sponsor acknowledges will not occur, as it requires 218 members of the House to vote to remove a tool that each party finds indispensable when it is in the minority and intolerable when it is in the majority.

Committee Note: This bill was reported unfavorably 4-30. During markup, the ranking member described the debt ceiling as “our most important tool for fiscal discipline,” a statement that would be more credible if the ceiling had not been raised every single time it was reached, 78 times in a row, often by the same members who praised it as a tool for restraint. The chair responded by reading aloud the S&P downgrade report. Both sides then agreed to disagree and proceeded to raise the debt ceiling again three weeks later.

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This bill was defeated 1-434, setting a record for the second-most lopsided vote in the session (surpassed only by the vote to name a post office). The single “yea” vote was cast by the sponsor, who noted in a floor speech that “the definition of insanity is raising the debt ceiling 78 times and pretending the 79th time will be the one where we exercise restraint.” No member responded, as most had left the chamber to prepare statements about fiscal responsibility for the evening news. The debt ceiling was raised without incident four months later.